Abstract. This paper contains a game theoretical analysis of animal contest situations which are asymmetric in more than one aspect: two opponents may for example be imagined which differ in 'ownership status' as well as in 'relative fighting ability'. The following question is analysed: which aspect may or must be used for conventional settlement in a population 'playing' an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) ? The contestants are assumed to be fully informed about the asymmetric features. In particular, the assessment of relative fighting ability is supposed to be unambiguous and without cost. This assumption of perfect information allows for a decomposition of the 'evolutionary game' into sub-games. Therefore an easy procedure for calculating the ESS's can be presented, and simple models are analysed. It is concluded that payoff-irrelevant aspects may be used for conventional settlement of a conflict even if payoff-relevant asymmetric aspects also exist. One of the aspects may, however, be of such strong relevance that, no matter which ESS is played, animals must base their decisions on that 'dominant' aspect. It may also occur that two different asymmetric features are each of strong payoff relevance for either of the opponents, such that they have no escalation-suppressing effect. The particular scenario of a conflict between an 'owner of a resource' and an 'intruder' is used to derive the more general conclusions.
I. Introduction
Maynard Smith & Price (1973) showed that game theory may be used for a functional analysis of animal contest behaviour. They introduced the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) with the particular intention of explaining, the conventional aspects of such behaviour in terms of individual selection. Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) analysed contest situations in which animals were supposed to find themselves having different roles such as 'owner' and 'intruder' in a territorial dispute. They draw an important conclusion for conflicts in which escalation is dangerous and information about an opponent's role is perfect: there will be one of two distinct roles, such that the player in that role is always the winner. This was shown even for contests with a 'payoffirrelevant' asymmetry, in which the role difference does not bias either the value of the resource competed for or the probability of winning an escalated fight.
Can an asymmetry of this kind still be used for settling the contest, when other more 'relevant' differences, such as in fighting ability, exist ? Should we for example expect a smaller owner of a territory to defend it against a larger intruder if size indicates fighting ability and if the territory is of the same or almost the same value to both of the opponents? For contests having several asymmetric features the obvious problem arises: which of them may or must be used for settlement by an ESS? The present paper proposes some simple mathematical models suggesting answers to this question. It also demonstrates an easy method of analysing a class of contests with perfect information. This method is closely related to the work done by Selten (1980) , to whom I am greatly indebted for helpful comments and advice.
It will be shown that individuals 'playing' an ESS may base their behaviour on a payoffirrelevant aspect of a contest situation, while ignoring a difference relevant to fighting ability. This is possible under the assumption that there is a risk of injury in an escalated contest which is considerable when compared to the payoff of obtaining the resource under competition. If the difference in fighting ability exceeds a critical value, the behaviour must be based on this relevant asymmetry.
A particular question for cases with a difference in more than one payoff-relevant aspect will be: what can be said about contest situations in which the value of the resource is not the same to the two opponents who, in addition, differ in fighting ability? Should for example a territory be defended in cases where the owner has much more to gain (lose) than an intruder ? It is demonstrated here that the difference in value of the resource is not the crucial factor determining whether a strategy of the type 'ignore small differences in fighting ability but respect ownership' may be evolutionarily stable.
